Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders Under CERCLA Secured Creditor Exemption Law by Cobb, M. Joan
Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law
Volume 40 Symposium on Growth Management and Exclusionary Zoning
January 1991
Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders
Under CERCLA Secured Creditor Exemption Law
M. Joan Cobb
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw
Part of the Law Commons
This Recent Development is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington University Open Scholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Urban Law Annual ; Journal of Urban and Contemporary Law by an authorized administrator of Washington University Open
Scholarship. For more information, please contact digital@wumail.wustl.edu.
Recommended Citation
M. Joan Cobb, Where Will It End? Increased Risks to Lenders Under CERCLA Secured Creditor Exemption Law, 40 Wash. U. J. Urb. &
Contemp. L. 249 (1991)
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol40/iss1/14
WHERE WILL IT END? INCREASED
RISKS TO LENDERS UNDER CERCLA
SECURED CREDITOR EXEMPTION LAW
I. INTRODUCTION
The nation's interest in environmental protection and clean-up is at
an all-time high.I In response to concern over abandoned and inopera-
tive hazardous waste sites, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).2
1. See generally Rich, Personal Liability for Hazardous Waste Cleanup: An Exami-
nation of CERCLA 107, 13 B.C. EvTL. Ass. L. REv. 643 (1986) (inactive hazardous
waste sites are severely threatening the environment).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9657 (1988). CERCLA provides two methods to induce
cleanup of hazardous waste sites. First, the President can order "potentially responsible
parties" (PRPs) to take remedial measures at the site. Second, as discussed in this Re-
cent Development, the government may take immediate action and later sue PRPs for
expenses. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988). This section of the statute provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of law, and subject only to the de-
fenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section-
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility,
(2) any person who at the time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or
operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were disposed of,
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or
treatment, or arranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity and containing such hazardous substances, and
(4) any person who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to
disposal or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incurrence
of response costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency
plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent
with the national contingency plan;
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To finance the government clean-up efforts under CERCLA, Congress
created a "Superfund, ' ' which the government can reimburse by hold-
ing responsible parties liable for the clean-up costs.4 The "potentially
responsible parties"5 include "owners and operators" of the facility.6
Specifically excluded from liability for clean-up costs are parties who,
without participating in the management of a site, "hold indicia of
ownership" primarily to protect a security interest.7 This provision al-
lows secured creditors - usually lending institutions - to protect their
financial interest in a business without risking the enormous task of
financing hazardous waste clean-up.'
Recently, however, courts have broadened CERCLA liability by
(C) damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural resources, including
the reasonable costs of assessing such injury, destruction, or loss resulting from
such release; and
(D) the costs of any health assessment or health effects study carried out under
section 9604(i) of this title.
Id. Prior to CERCLA's enactment, the existing law regulated hazardous waste man-
agement. H.R. REP. No. 1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, reprinted in 1980 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 6119, 6120. Neither state nor federal law, however, dealt with
treatment of previously contaminated waste disposal sites. Note, Environmental Law -
Joint and Several Liability Under CERCLA - United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 57
TEMP. L.Q. 885 (1984) (discussing joint and several liability under CERCLA).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 9631 (1988). The initial monies in Superfund were provided by a
special tax on chemical and petroleum producers and general tax revenues. 26 U.S.C.
§§ 4611-4612, 4661-4662 (1982).
4. The EPA has been delegated primary responsibility to seek reimbursement.
Exec. Order No. 12,316, § (1)(c), 3 C.F.R. 168, 169 (1982). To recover costs from the
responsible parties, the government must show that the site is a facility from which a
release or threatened release of a hazardous substance occurred and therefore caused
the government to incur response costs. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1)-(4) (1988).
5. See supra note 2 for the CERCLA definition of "potentially responsible parties."
6. Courts have construed CERCLA to impose strict, joint and several, and retroac-
tive liability on responsible parties. Note, Interpreting the Meaning of Lender Manage-
ment Participation Under Section 101(20)(A) of CERCLA, 98 YALE L.J. 925 (1989)
(proposes that courts applying CERCLA look to guidelines developed under analogous
doctrines of lender liability). See, eg., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032,
1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
7. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988).
8. The party asserting the exemption has the burden of proving that it is entitled to
the exemption. See United States v. First City Nat'l Bank of Houston, 386 U.S. 361
(1967); Federal Trade Comm'n v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37 (1948); SEC v. Ameri-
can Int'l Say. & Loan Assoc., 199 F. Supp. 341 (1961). See Note, Wfhen a Security
Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous Waste Cleanup, 38 HAS-
TrINGS L.J. 1273 (1987) (discussing Congress' policy behind exempting secured creditors
from CERCLA liability).
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holding secured creditors liable in situations ostensibly insulated by the
secured creditor exemption.9 This trend, illustrated in United States v.
Fleet Factors Corp. 10 and In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.," has shocked the
lending community.
II. HISTORY
A. In re T.P. Long Chemical, Co.
The issue of lender liability for environmental clean-up in a bank-
ruptcy proceeding first arose in In re T.P. Long Chemical, Co.'2 In
T.P. Long, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), in accord-
ance with CERCLA section 107(a), sought reimbursement from both
T.P. Long Chemical Company's estate and its secured creditor,
BancOhio,"3 for costs incurred from removing hazardous chemicals
found on the property of the estate. 4
Pursuant to a petition for dissolution, the bankruptcy trustee con-
ducted an auction selling all of the property of T.P. Long Chemical
Company's estate. 5 The sale, however, did not include undiscovered
drums of hazardous substances which were subject to BancOhio's se-
curity interest.' 6 A person professionally associated with the buyer of
the property, either directly or indirectly, caused a release of a hazard-
ous substance by opening a valve on one tank. 7 The EPA later deter-
mined that a release of the hazardous substance had occurred,
warranting immediate action."
After reviewing the facts, the bankruptcy court did not find
9. See infra notes 54-98 and accompanying text discussing United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1Ith Cir. 1990) and In re Bergsoe Metals, 910 F.2d 668
(9th Cir. 1990).
10. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
11. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
12. 45 Bankr. 278 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985).
13. Id. at 281. The secured creditor held a perfected security interest in the debtor's
accounts receivable, equipment, fixtures, inventory, and other personal property of the
debtor. Id.
14. Id.
15. Id. Apparently, T.P. Long knew of the existence of approximately 90 drums
containing hazardous substances. Id. The property was purchased by the Tompkins
Corporation, or Leonard Tompkins, or both. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id. Initially, the EPA ordered clean-up because of the tank release. It was not
until the cleanup effort that the EPA discovered all of the drums. Id.
1991)
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BancOhio liable under CERCLA section 107(a).' 9 In reaching its con-
clusion, the court stated that even if BancOhio had foreclosed on its
security interest, BancOhio would not be an "owner or operator" as
defined by CERCLA.2 ° Furthermore, BancOhio was not an "opera-
tor" because it did not participate in the management of the facility.2
Rather, as a secured creditor, BancOhio fell under the secured creditor
exemption. The only "indicia of ownership" that could be attributed
to BancOhio was the protection of its security interest.22 Conse-
quently, CERCLA's secured creditor exemption shielded BancOhio
from incurring liability.
B. United States v. Mirabile
Soon after the T.P. Long decision, a Pennsylvania district court reex-
amined the secured creditor exemption issue in United States v.
Mirabile.23 In Mirabile, the court considered circumstances in which
the EPA could impose CERCLA liability upon parties that have fi-
nanced an "owner or operator" of a hazardous waste site.24
The EPA sought to recover clean-up costs incurred at an inoperative
paint manufacturing business (Turco). One of the secured creditors,
American Bank and Trust (ABT), loaned money to the paint company,
secured by a mortgage on the property.25 The other secured creditor,
Mellon Bank26 (Mellon), advanced working capital to Turco in that
19. Id. at 288. Additionally, the court held that BancOhio, as a secured creditor,
had received no benefit from the EPA clean-up and was therefore not liable. Id. The
court found the debtor's estate liable under CERCLA because the estate had an owner-
ship interest in the drums containing hazardous waste. Id. at 284. The drums them-
selves fell within CERCLA's definition of a facility. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(a) (1988).
Therefore, as owner of the "facility," the court found the estate liable under 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607(a) (1988). The court rejected the trustee's argument that the drums were "aban-
doned" under the trustee's power to abandon. 45 Bankr. at 284.
20. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (1988).
21. In re T.P. Long, 45 Bankr. at 289.
22. Id.
23. 15 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 4, 1985).
24. Id. at 20,993. The secured creditors were American Bank and Trust Company
and Mellon Bank National Association. Id. at 2%992. The two creditors joined the
Small Business Administration to share the cost in the event of lender liability. Id.
25. ABT initially loaned money to Arthur C. Mangels Industries, Inc., but Turco-
the site involved in this dispute-later acquired Mangels. Id. at 20,994.
26. Originally Gerard Bank advanced the money, but Gerard was the predecessor
in interest to Mellon. Id. at 20,995.
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same year. In 1980, Turco filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.2" In 1981,
the court dismissed Turco's bankruptcy action, resulting in ABT fore-
closing on its security interest.2" ABT bid on the property at a sheriff's
sale, and four months later, assigned its bid to the Mirabiles.2 9
After the EPA cleaned up the site, it sought contribution from the
Mirabiles for costs incurred." The Mirabiles joined ABT and Mellon,
alleging that the banks were "responsible parties" in accordance with
CERCLA section 107(a).3 1 In support of its motion for summary
judgment, ABT argued that it was not an "owner" of the property
because it never held legal title.32 ABT also claimed that its actions
involving Turco were "merely to protect its security interest."33 The
court granted ABT's motion, maintaining that passage of title bore no
relevance to the applicability of the security interest exemption.34
Moreover, the court reasoned that ABT's foreclosure was "plainly un-
dertaken in an effort to protect its security interest in the property."3
Holding secured creditors liable, including lending institutions, the
court conceded, would enhance the government's chances of recover-
ing clean-up costs, and would help insure more responsible manage-
ment of such sites.36 The court explained, however, that the decision
to impose liability is a legislative one, which necessarily should lie with
Congress in the first instance.3 7
The court then opined that in order to hold a secured creditor such
as ABT liable, the creditor must at a minimum participate in the "day-
to-day" operational activities at the site.3" The court determined that
ABT's activities did not rise to a level sufficient to hold ART liable
pursuant to CERCLA section 101(20)(A).39
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 20,993. The Mirabiles accepted a sheriff's deed to the property. Id.
30. Id. at 20,992.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 20,995-96. Mellon also filed for summary judgment. Id. at 20,995.
33. Id. at 20,996.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 20,997.
39. ABT's activities consisted of securing the building against vandalism, making
inquiries as to the cost of disposal of various drums located on the property, and visiting
the property to show it to prospective purchasers. Id. at 20,996. The activities oc-
19911
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In contrast, the court denied Mellon's motion for summary judg-
ment due to Mellon's increased level of participation at the site. When
financial troubles plagued Turco, Mellon became extensively involved
in Turco's business.4" At one point, Mellon made weekly visits and
gave instructions concerning manufacturing and personnel. 41 These
activities presented a genuine issue as to whether Mellon participated
in management to an extent sufficient to impose CERCLA liability. In
sum, although Mellon, as a lending institution, should have technically
fallen within the scope of CERCLA's secured creditor exemption, the
Mirabile court glossed over that exception, and instead, examined the
facts keeping both eyes focused on CERCLA's "owner and operator"
provision.
C. United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.
In 1986, United States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co.4" presented
the courts with another opportunity to define the parameters of secured
creditor liability for CERCLA response costs.
In Maryland Bank, the bank foreclosed against a hazardous waste
site when the debtor failed to make payments on its loan.43 The bank
purchased the property at the foreclosure sale" and continued to hold
title as of the date of trial.45 One year after the bank's acquisition of
title, the EPA discovered hazardous wastes at the site and proceeded to
curred in the four-month period between the sale and the assignment of the bid to the
Mirabiles. Id.
40. Id. at 20,997.
41. Id. The court stated that Mellon's earlier activities; monitoring of cases and
collateral accounts, ensuring that receivables went into the proper account, and estab-
lishing a reporting system between the company and the bank, were not sufficient to
establish CERCLA liability. Id. The court noted that:
Mhe reed upon which the Mirabiles seek to impose liability on Mellon is slender
indeed; however, bearing in mind that all doubts are to be resolved in favor of that
party opposing summary judgment, I conclude that, taken as a whole... [it]
presents a genuine issue of fact as to whether Mellon Bank... engaged in the sort
of participation in management which would bring a secured creditor within the
scope of CERCLA liability.
Id. For a view that Mirabile was a "bittersweet victory" for the lending community, see
Note, When a Security Becomes a Liability: Claims Against Lenders in Hazardous
Waste Cleanup, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 1279, 1261-96 (1987).
42. 632 F. Supp. 573 (D. Md. 1986).
43. Id. at 575.
44. Id.
45. Id. The trial was held four years after the foreclosure sale. Id.
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clean up the area.46 The EPA sought reimbursement from the bank,
claiming that the bank should be held liable as an "owner or operator"
pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a).47 By acquiring ownership of the
site through foreclosure on a security interest in the property and
purchasing the land at the foreclosure sale, however, the bank main-
tained that it should be entitled to the secured creditor exemption.4"
The Maryland court rejected the bank's position, stressing the critical
nature of the verb tense in the exclusionary clause.49 Further, the
court stated that the security interest must exist at the time of the
clean-up."0 The court explained that the bank's mortgage terminated
at the foreclosure sale, at which time it "ripened" into full title.5"
Although the finding appeared to reject the holding in Mirabile, in
reality it did not do so. The court emphasized the fact that the bank
held title for four years, and declined to consider whether a secured
party who purchased the property at a foreclosure sale and then
promptly resold it would be unable to assert the secured creditor ex-
emption." Therefore, the holding in Maryland Bank proved to be fact
specific.5
3
46. Id. EPA initially requested the bank to initiate corrective measures at the site,
but the bank declined. Id. The EPA removed 237 drums of chemical material and
1180 tons of contaminated soil. Id. at 575-76.
47. See supra note 2 for text of statute.
48. Maryland Bank, 632 F. Supp. at 577.
49. The court stated that the exemption covers "only those persons who, at the time.
of the clean-up, hold indicia of ownership to protect a then-held security interest in the
land." Id. at 579 (emphasis added).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 579 n.5. In an expeditious foreclosure and resale, the secured creditor
could have a stronger argument that its actions were solely to protect the value of the
security interest.
53. For additional examples of court holdings supporting the trend in narrow read-
ings of the secured creditor exemption, see Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-
Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568 (5th Cir. 1988) (affirming denial of motion to dismiss an
action brought by homeowner involving subdivision upon which toxic waste had accu-
mulated prior to development - defendants included a bank which loaned money to a
subdivision developer); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F. Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa.
1989) (granting Government's request for leave to file a second amended complaint
which alleged that mortgagee who participated in management was directly liable under
CERCLA; the mortgagee had stock interest in owner of contaminated property);
Guidice v. BFG Electroplating & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp. 556 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (denying
motion for summary judgment in a suit by BFG for contribution toward clean-up costs
where the bank bid for contaminated property at a foreclosure sale).
1991]
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III. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS CONCERNING THE SECURED
CREDITOR EXEMPTION
A. United States v. Fleet Factors Corp.
The lending community suffered a severe blow by the recent decision
in United States v. Fleet Factors Corp. 54 In Fleet Factors, the secured
creditor (Fleet) foreclosed on its security interest in a cloth printing
facility (SPW). 5 Fleet contracted with professional liquidators to auc-
tion off the inventory and equipment.56 Thereafter, Fleet contracted
with an individual to remove the remaining equipment.5 7 Later, the
EPA inspected the facility58 and discovered drums holding hazardous
substances, as well as truckloads of materials containing asbestos.5 9
After discovery of the contaminated substances, the federal govern-
ment cleaned the area.6'
The Government sued several parties,61 including Fleet, to recover
response costs. 62 The Government argued that pursuant to CERCLA
section 107(a), Fleet was liable for clean-up costs as an "owner or oper-
ator"63 of the facility at the time wastes were disposed.
6 4
54. 901 F.2d 1550 (11th Cir. 1990).
55. Id. at 1552. Under the agreemen"oetween Fleet and SPW, Fleet agreed to ad-
vance funds against the assignment of SPW's accounts receivable. Id. Fleet obtained a
security interest in SPW's textile facility, equipment, inventory, and fixtures as collat-
eral for the advances. Id. Fleet eventually ceased advancing funds once SPW's debt to
Fleet exceeded the estimated value of SPW's accounts receivable. Id. Eventually SPW
filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy. Id.
56. Id. Fleet's liquidators sold the items "as is" and "in place." Id. The removal
became the responsibility of the purchasers. Id. at 1553-54.
57. This individual was Nix Riggers. Riggers testified that Fleet instructed him to
leave the premises "broom clean." Id. at 1553. He blieved that he was given a "free
hand" to take any necessary steps to remove the items. Id.
58. Riggers had left the facility by the end of December, 1983. Id. The EPA in-
spected the facility on January 20, 1984. Id.
59. Id.
60. The Government spent nearly $400,000 in cleaning the SPW area. Id.
61. The Government sued the two principal officers and stockholders of SPW as
well. Id.
62. Id. The district court granted the Government's summary judgment motion
against the officers for liability with respect to removing the drums. Id. The district
court denied the motion with respect to the officers' liability for the asbestos clean-up, as
well as Fleet's motion with respect to any liability. Id. Fleet's appeal to the denial of
summary judgement is the subject matter of the present case.
63. See supra note 2 for the CERCLA class of "potentially responsible parties,"
which includes past and present owners and operators.
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Fleet claimed that CERCLA's secured creditor exemption protected
it from liability.65 The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals announced
that there was no question that Fleet held an "indicia of ownership" in
the facility through its deed of trust to SPW, and that Fleet held the
interest primarily to protect its security interest.6 6 The court empha-
sized that the key issue was whether Fleet's level of participation in
SPW's management was sufficient to expose Fleet to CERCLA
liability. 67
The Government urged the court to adopt a narrow and strictly lit-
64. The court dismissed the Government's first argument that Fleet was liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(aX1) as a "present owner or operator" of the facility. Fleet
Factors, 901 F.2d at 1554. The court construed "present owner or operator" to mean
an "individual or entity owning or operating the facility at the time the plaintiff initiated
the lawsuit by filing a complaint." Id. Under this method, the present owner of the
facility was Emanuel County, Georgia. Id. at 1555. The county obtained the facility at
a foreclosure sale on July 7, 1987, when SPW failed to pay state and county taxes. Id.
at 1553. The court found that the Government could not hold the county liable under
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D), which provides that a state or local government which has
involuntarily acquired title to a facility is not generally liable as the owner or operator.
Id. at 1555 n.4. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) states:
The term "owner or operator" does not include a unit of State or local government
which acquired ownership or control involuntarily through bankruptcy, tax delin-
quency, abandonment, or other circumstances in which the government involunta-
rily acquires title by virtue of its function as sovereign. The exclusion provided
under this paragraph shall not apply to any State or local government which has
caused or contributed to the release or threatened release of a hazardous substance
from the facility, and such a State or local government shall be subject to the provi-
sions of this chapter in the same manner and to the same extent, both procedurally
and substantively, as any nongovernmental entity, including liability under section
9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(D) (1988).
Instead, if the government acquires title due to foreclosure, tax delinquency, aban-
donment, etc., the owner or operator is any person who operated or otherwise con-
trolled activities at such facility immediately before government acquisition. Fleet
Factors, 901 F.2d at 1555. The court determined that the meaning of "immediately
beforehand" means without intervening ownership, operation, and control. Id. Since
Fleet never owned, operated, or controlled SPW before the county's acquisition, the
court could not find Fleet liable under 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(1). Id.
65. Id. Fleet had the burden of establishing its entitlement to the exemption. Id. at
1555-56.
66. Id. at 1555.
67. Id. at 1556 n.6. The court explained that this involved two "distinct, but re-
lated" ways of imposing liability upon Fleet. Id. First, Fleet could be held liable as an
"operator" of the facility as defined under the statute. Id. Second, Fleet could be liable
if it held indicia of ownership in SPW and managed the facility to the "extent necessary
to remove it from the secured creditor liability exemption." Id. (emphasis added).
Although this case did not present facts which showed participation in management
1991]
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eral interpretation of the secured creditor exemption and exclude from
protection any secured creditor that participates in "any manner" in
the facility's management.68 Fleet, alternatively, urged the court to
hold a secured creditor liable only if it participated in the "day-to-day"
management of the facility.6 9 The court of appeals rejected both of
these tests and adopted a moderate approach.70 The court's rule holds
a secured creditor who is not an operator liable under CERCLA sec-
tion 107(a)(2) if the creditor participates in the financial management
of the facility to a degree indicating a "capacity to influence"71 the
facility's hazardous waste treatment. 2 The secured creditor need not
participate in decisions concerning waste treatment.73 Nor does the
creditor need to participate in day-to-day operations.74 As long as the
secured creditor's involvement with the facility supports the "inference
differing from those indicating operation, the court stated that this could occur in some
circumstances. Id.
68. Id. at 1556.
69. Id. This was the approach adopted in United States v. Mirabile, 15 Envtl. L.
Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 20,992 (E.D. Pa., Sept. 4, 1985) (district court granted summary
judgment to defendant creditors because their participation in the facility was limited to
participation in financial decisions). Accord United States v. New Castle County, 727 F.
Supp. 854 (D. Del. 1989); Rockwell Int'l v. IU Int'l Corp., 702 F. Supp. 1384 (N.D. Ill.
1988); see supra notes 2341 and accompanying text for a discussion of this case. The
lower court in Fleet Factors agreed with the Mirabile approach. United States v. Fleet
Factors Corp., 724 F. Supp. 955 (S.D. Ga. 1988). Accord Guidice v. BFG Electroplat-
ing & Mfg. Co., 732 F. Supp 556 (W.D. Pa. 1989); United States v. Nicolet Inc., 712 F.
Supp. 1193 (E.D. Pa. 1989).
70. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557. The court found the district court's test "too
permissive towards secured creditors who are involved with toxic waste facilities." Id.
The court stressed that in order to achieve the "overwhelming remedial" goal of CER-
CLA, "ambiguous statutory terms should be construed to favor liability for the costs
incurred by the government in responding to the hazards at such facilities." Id.
71. Id. This test is similar to the "authority to control" test that some courts have
discussed regarding attempts to "pierce the corporate veil" and hold individual officers
liable for environmental cleanup. Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders'
Risks Under Superfund, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 19, col. 1. For an example of a
court which was receptive to such arguments, see United States v. Northeastern Phar-
maceutical & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726 (8th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 848
(1987). The "authority to control" test also may come into play when someone wishes
to hold parent corporations vicariously liable for the acts of subsidiaries. See generally,
Freeman, Two Recent Decisions Restrict Superfund Vicarious Liability, Nat'l L.J., April
16, 1990, at 24.
72. Fleet Factors, 901 F.2d at 1557.
73. Id. at 1558.
74. Id. at 1557.
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that it could affect" hazardous waste decisions, it may be held liable.75
Under the new rule, the court found sufficient facts to hold Fleet
liable pursuant to CERCLA section 107(a)(2). 76 Although Fleet's ini-
tial activities with SPW fell within the secured creditor exemption,"
Fleet's activity increased substantially after SPW ceased operations,
causing it to fall outside the exemption.78 In particular, the court
found that Fleet's requirements that: (1) SPW seek approval before
shipping goods to customers; (2) SPW establish price for excess inven-
75. Id. at 1558. The court stated that legislative history supported its conclusion:
'"he Senate version of CERCLA initially lacked an exemption for secured credi-
tors in its definition of "owner or operator." Representative Harsha introduced
the exemption to the bill that was finally passed stating:
This change is necessary because the original definition inadvertently subjected
those who hold title to a... facility, but do not participate in the management or
operation and are not otherwise affiliated with the person leasing or operating the
... facility, to the liability provisions of the bill.
The use of the word "affiliated" to describe the threshold at which a secured credi-
tor becomes liable clearly indicates a more peripheral degree of involvement with
the affairs of a facility than that necessary to be held liable as an operator. It also
suggests that the interpretation of the exemption by Congress is more consistent
with the level of secured creditor involvement described in our opinion than with
the management of day-to-day operations standard set forth in Mirabile.
Id. at 1558 n.l 1 (citing S. 1480, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. reprinted in 2 SENATE COMM. ON
ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TII CONG., 2D SESS., 1A LEGISLATIVE HIs-
TORY OF CERCLA 470 (Comm. Print 1983); Remarks of Rep. Harsha, reprinted in 2
SENATE COMM. ON ENVIRONMENTAL AND PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESs., A
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF CERCLA 945 (Comm. Print 1983)).
Additionally, the court emphasized the desired effect upon secured creditors:
Our ruling today should encourage potential creditors to investigate thoroughly
the waste treatment systems and policies of potential debtors. If the treatment
systems seem inadequate, the risk of CERCLA liability will be weighed into the
terms of the loan agreement. Creditors, therefore, will incur no greater risk than
they bargained for and debtors, aware that inadequate hazardous waste treatment
will have a significant adverse impact on their loan terms, will have powerful in-
centives to improve their handling of hazardous wastes.
Similarly, creditors' awareness that they are potentially liable under CERCLA
will encourage them to monitor the hazardous waste treatment systems and poli-
cies of their debtors and insist upon compliance with acceptable treatment stan-
dards as a prerequisite to continued and future financial support.
Id. at 1558.
76. Id. at 1559.
77. Id. From 1976 until SPW ceased operation, Fleet's activities consisted of ad-
vancing funds to SPW against the assignment of SPW's accounts receivable, paying and
arranging for security deposits for SPW's utilities, and informing SPW it would not
advance further funds when Fleet determined that the loan outstanding exceeded the
value of its accounts receivable. Id.
78. Id.
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tory; and (3) Fleet determined to whom and when finished goods
should be shipped, failed to satisfy the secured creditor exemption.79
Furthermore, Fleet made layoff decisions, supervised the office admin-
istrator's activities, controlled access to the facility, and contracted to
dispose of the SPW fixtures and equipment.8" Consequently, Fleet's
involvement in the actual decisions concerning hazardous waste dispo-
sal made a determination of its capacity to influence hazardous waste
treatment derived by its involvement in the facility's financial manage-
ment unnecessary. 1
B. In re Bergsoe Metal Corp.
In re Bergsoe Metal Corp. 82 is a recent post-Fleet Factors decision
considering the secured creditor exemption. In Bergsoe, the Port of St.
Helens (the Port), a municipal corporation, issued industrial develop-
ment revenue bonds83 to provide funds for the acquisition of land and
the construction of a lead recycling facility.84 The Port sold the ac-
quired land to Bergsoe, who in return gave the Port a promissory note
and a mortgage on the property.85 The Port, the United States Bank of
Oregon, and Bergsoe entered into a complicated financing
arrangement.8 6
79. Id.
80. Id. The court found these activities to be "pervasive, if not complete" participa-
tion in SPW's financial management. Id.
81. Id. at 1559 n.13. Fleet had apparently prohibited SPW from selling barrels of
chemicals to potential buyers. Id.
82. 910 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1990).
83. Id. at 669. The Port issued pollution control revenue bonds as well. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 670.
86. Id. At the "heart" of the arrangement were the previously issued revenue
bonds. Id. The Port, Bergsoe and the United States Bank of Oregon entered into a
series of interlocking transactions. Id. The first transaction was a sale and lease-back
arrangement between Bergsoe and the Port. Id. Bergsoe conveyed to the Port by war-
ranty deed 50 acres and the not yet constructed recycling plant. Id. Bergsoe and the
Port then entered into two leases covering the plant and the property. Id. Bergsoe
agreed to construct the plant and pay rent directly to the Bank. Id. The rent equalled
the principal and interest to come due on the bonds. Id. The leases gave Bergsoe the
option of purchasing the entire facility for $100 once the bonds had been paid in full.
Id.
The second transaction involved two mortgage and indentures of trust between the
Port and the Bank. Id. at 670. The mortgage and indentures corresponded to the
leases. Id. The Port agreed to issue the revenue bonds, then mortgaged the property
and recycling plant to the Bank - as trustee for the bondholders. Id. In addition, the
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The facility failed, soon after opening, and the bank forced the owner
into bankruptcy. 7 By this time, the Department of Environmental
Quality had discovered contamination at the plant site.88 The bank
and the trustee in bankruptcy filed suit against the stockholders 9 for
the clean-up costs." The owners counterclaimed against the Port,
claiming that the Port was liable for the CERCLA clean-up costs.91
Although the Port did not participate in any management of the facil-
ity, the owners claimed that the Port was liable due to its involvement
in the planning stages of the facility,92 its rights under certain leases,93
and its right to direct that the company properly store hazardous
wastes.94 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected all of the
owner's arguments,95 explaining that the Port's mere authority to man-
age the facility was not sufficient to defeat the exemption. The court
reasoned that a secured creditor must "actually exercise" its manage-
ment authority to be held liable under CERCLA.96 The Bergsoe court
Port assigned its rights under the leases and the revenues generated from the leases to
the Bank. Id. The Bank agreed to hold the amounts generated from bond sales in a
construction fund to be paid to Bergsoe. Id. The indentures obligated the Bank to
collect rent under the leases and apply the rent in retirement of the bonds. Id. Addi-
tionally, the Bank purchased the bonds. Id. The Port then signed an agreement
whereby the Port subordinated all its rights under the prior $400,000 obligation to the
Bank's rights under the leases. Id.
The Port also placed the warranty deeds, bill of sale and UCC release statements in
escrow with the Bank. Id. The Port instructed the Bank to deliver the documents to
Bergsoe when the company exercised its option to purchase the facility. Id.
87. Bergsoe, 910 F.2d at 670.
88, Id.
89 Id. The stockholders were the East Asiatic Company and Heidelberg Eastern,
Inc. collectively. Id. These companies own Bergsoe's stock. Id.
90. Id.
91, Id.
92. Id. at 672. The court explained that if it adopted this position, the secured
creditor exemption would cease to have any meaning. Most creditors lend only after
gathering information and providing input in the planning stages of a project. Id.
93. Id. See supra note 86 discussing the lease arrangement. The leases included a
right to inspect the premises and to reenter and take possession upon foreclosure. Berg-
soe, 910 F.2d at 672.
94. Id. at 673 n.3.
95. Id. at 672-73. The court also determined that the legal title held by the Port did
not make it an owner because the Port held this title merely to protect its security
interest. Id. at 671.
96. Id. at 672.
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thus rejected Fleet Factors' "capacity to influence" test, 97 opting for
proof of actual management. Although the court did not address ex-
actly what forms of participation in management will cause a creditor
to fall outside the secured creditor protection, Bergsoe definitely repre-
sents a shift back toward secured creditor protection.9"
C. Proposed Environmental Protection Agency Rule 99
The EPA conceded that the secured creditor exemption issue gener-
ated a great deal of confusion in the lending community. 1°° In re-
sponse to that confusion, the EPA proposed a rule to clarify secured
creditor exemption law.11 Under the EPA proposal,"0 2 CERCLA will
continue to protect a secured creditor acting to protect its security in-
terest so long as the creditor acts consistently with the statute's pur-
pose. 103 This proposal places an affirmative obligation on creditors to
inspect or audit the collateral securing the loan to minimize environ-
mental liability."°
In addition to placing affirmative obligations on secured creditors to
inspect, the proposed rule focuses on defining three previously unde-
fined terms in CERCLA section 101(20)(A).1°5 These terms are: (1)
97. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text for the discussion of the "capacity
to influence" test.
98. For a discussion that this shift is not of much aid to secured creditors, see Free-
man, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under Superfund, Nat'l L.J., Sept.
17, 1990, at 19, col. 4, explaining that the Bergsoe court did not have to engage in line
drawing since the Port did not participate in any aspect of the management. The case
does not help secured creditors who do have some limited involvement.
99. EPA Draft Proposal Defining Lender Liability Issues Under the Secured Creditor
Exemption of CERCLA, 21 Env't Rep. (BNA) 1162-67 (Oct. 12, 1990). [hereinafter
Draft Proposal].
100. Id. at 1162.
101. Id.
102. The proposed rule will become effective upon publication in the Federal Regis-
ter. Id. This procedure is in accordance with subsections 553(b) and (d) of the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b), (d) (1988).
The sections allow the EPA to issue interpretive rules without providing notice and
opportunity to comment. Id. Because of the important nature of the secured creditor
issue, the EPA allowed public comment for a 60-day period. Draft Proposal, supra note
99, at 1162.
103. Id. at 1164.
104. Id. at 1167 n.3.
105. Id. at 1163-65. Additionally, the EPA defined the terms of CERCLA
§ 9601(35)(a)(ii) so that the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) and the Federal De-
posit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which may obtain a security interest or ownership
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"indicia of ownership;" (2) "primarily to protect a security interest;"
of a contaminated facility as the result of actions mandated under the Federal Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73,
103 Stat. 183, fall within the scope of the innocent landowner defense. 42 U.S.C.
§§ 9607(b)(3), 9601(35) (1988). The innocent landowner defense states in § 9607(b):
There shall be no liability under subsection (a) of this section for a person other-
wise liable who can establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the release or
threat of release of a hazardous substance and the damages resulting therefrom
were caused solely by...
(3) an act or omission of a third party other than an employee or agent of the
defendant, or than one whose act or omission occurs in connection with a contrac-
tual relationship, existing directly or indirectly, with the defendant (except where
the sole contractual arrangement arises from a published tariff and acceptance for
carriage by a common carrier by rail), if the defendant establishes by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that (a) he exercised due care with respect to the hazardous
substance concerned, taking into consideration the characteristics of such hazard-
ous substance, in light of all relevant facts and circumstances, and (b) he took
precautions against foreseeable acts or omissions of any such third party and the
consequences that could foreseeably result from such acts or omissions.
42 U.S.C. § 9607(b) (3) (1988). The rest of the innocent landowner defense is referred
to in § 9601(35XA)-(B), which states:
(35XA) The term "contractual relationship", for the purpose of section
9607(bX3) of this title includes, but is not limited to, land contracts, deeds or other
instruments transferring title or possession, unless the real property on which the
facility concerned is located was acquired by the defendant after the disposal or
placement of the hazardous substance on, in, or at the facility, and one or more of
the circumstances described in clause (i), (ii), or (iii) is also established by a prepon-
derance of the evidence:
(i) At the time the defendant acquired the facility the defendant did not know
and had no reason to know that any hazardous substance which is the subject of
the release or threatened release was disposed of on, in, or at the facility.
(ii) The defendant is a government entity which acquired the facility by es-
cheat, or through any other involuntary transfer or acquisition, or through the
exercise of eminent domain authority by purchase or condemnation.
(iii) the defendant acquired the facility by inheritance or bequest.
In addition to establishing the foregoing, the defendant must establish that he has
satisfied the requirements of section 9607(b)(3)(a) and (b) of this title.
(B) To establish that the defendant had no reason to know, as provided in clause
(i) of subparagraph (A) of this paragraph, the defendant must have undertaken, at
the time of acquisition, all appropriate inquiry into the previous ownership and
uses of the property consistent with good commercial or customary practice in an
effort to minimize liability. For purposes of the preceding sentence the court shall
take into account any specialized knowledge or experience on the part of the de-
fendant, the relationship of the purchase price to the value of the property if uncon-
taminated, commonly known or reasonably ascertainable information about the
property, the obviousness of the presence or likely presence of contamination at the
property, and the ability to detect such contamination by appropriate inspection.
42 U.S.C. § 9601(35)(A)-(B) (1988).
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and (3) "participating in the management of a... facility." 106
The EPA defines "indicia of ownership" as interests in real or per-
sonal property held as security or collateral for a loan.10 7  Examples
of such indicia may include, but are not limited to a mortgage, deed of
trust, or legal title obtained in a foreclosure.108
The EPA spent much more energy defining the term "primarily to
protect the security interest,"' 1 9 and gave secured creditors wide lati-
tude in protecting their security interests."o Under the proposed rule,
a secured creditor may attempt to protect its interest by policing the
loan,111 undertaking financial "work out" with a borrower where the
106. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(20)(A) (1988). The EPA stressed that although the secured
creditor exemption provides lenders with potential exemption from CERCLA liability,
the section does not otherwise protect secured creditors from the risk that the collat-
eral's market value may not be sufficient to cover the borrower's debt. Draft Proposal,
supra note 99, at 1163. The EPA stated, "[t]he CERCLA secured creditor exemption is
not a loan guarantee for lending institutions and does not shift to the Superfund the cost
of poor loan decisions, but serves only as a shield from CERCLA liability." Id. This
policy is exemplified in the proposed rule when the EPA explains that any enhancement
of the value of the collateral, during the time the secured creditor is holding its indicia
of ownership, which the secured creditor realizes at foreclosure sale over the value while
contaminated, must be given to the EPA. Id. at 1165. The EPA justifies this as "equi-
table reimbursement." Id. However, a creditor may have a strong argument that the
EPA is unjustly enriched if the agency recovers response costs as well as reimbursement
from a secured creditor's sale.
107. Id. at 1163. This includes real or personal property acquired in the course of
protecting the security interest. Id. The EPA also acknowledged that the nature of the
ownership interest may vary under different state laws and by the type of the secured
loan transaction. Id. Irrespective of these differences, the interest must be for the pur-
pose of securing the loan to come within the exception. Id. The EPA explained that
under CERCLA, the secured holder's ownership interest is "not the facility itself but
the extent to which the facility or inventory represents a guarantee for the debtor's
unpaid obligation." Id.
108. Draft Proposal, supra note 99, at 1163.
109. Id. at 1163-64.
110. The EPA stressed that the creditors' actions must relate to only "true security
interests." Id. at 1163. Therefore, if a secured creditor holds interest in property for
investment purposes, the lenders' actions are not exempted. Id. Although lenders usu-
ally make loans to generate revenue, such an interest does not equate with "investment"
according to the EPA. Id.
111. "Policing the loan" includes actions such as requiring environmental audits
before the loan is approved, cleanup of the property prior to or during the life of the
loan, allowing the lender to regularly inspect both the property used for collateral and
the borrower's financial condition, and requiring the borrower to assure the lender that
the borrower is complying with federal, state, and local environmental rules. Id. at
1164. The EPA explains that "such requirements may be contained in lender imposed
requirements for financial, environmental, and other warranties, covenants, and repre-
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security interest is threatened," 2 and foreclosing and "expeditiously
liquidating""' 3 the assets securing the loan." 4 Accordingly, if the se-
cured creditor takes these actions to protect its interest, the EPA will
not consider the actions "participation in the management" of a
facility. 115
Whether a lender's participation in the management of a facility
meets the EPA definition depends upon various considerations. The
EPA will consider the "nature of the borrowers' business, the areas in
which the lender becomes involved, whether the facility is in possession
of the borrower or lender (after foreclosure), the actual control exer-
cised by the lender.., and whether the lender has caused or contrib-
uted to environmental harm."" 16  The EPA directly refuted Fleet
Factors' holding" 7 that mere "capacity to influence" facility opera-
tions voids the exemption, explaining that a lender has participated in
management to such an extent to fall outside the secured creditor ex-
emption protection if the borrower remains in possession, and the
lender has materially divested the borrower of its decision making
power over the facility operations."'
sentations or promises from the borrower, as conditions for the loan and included in the
loan documents. Id. These requirements do not make the lender a guarantor of envi-
ronmental safety at the facility. Id.
112. A loan "work out" oocurs when a lender needs to protect collateral from loss
- usually when the loan is either in or near default. Id. Such actions may include
"restructuring or renegotiation of the terms of the loan obligation, payment of addi-
tional interest, extension of the payment period, [or] specific financial or operational
advice." Id. Other actions taken by the secured creditor may also fall within the ex-
emption. The key to retaining the exemption is that the borrower must remain the
"ultimate decision maker" for the facility operation. Id.
113. The creditor must hold the property for no longer than six months, or else the
burden of proof will shift to the lender to show that it continues to hold the property
primarily to protect its security interest. Id. at 1165.
114. Id. at 1164. This exemption also covers any other formal or informal process
through which the lender acquires possession of the borrowers' collateral for disposi-
tion. The EPA notes that the lender's actions "in outbidding or refusing bids from
parties offering fair consideration for the property are evidence that the property is no
longer being held primarily to protect the security interest." Id.
115. Id. The EPA also requires that any action the lender takes does not "cause or
contribute by act or omission" to the environmental harm at the site. Id.
116. Id. at 1165.
117. See supra notes 54-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fleet Fac-
tors case.
118. Draft Proposal, supra note 99, at 1165. The EPA noted that the lender is in an
even worse position if the lender divested the borrower of decision making control over
hazardous waste disposal and treatment. The EPA allows a secured creditor to remain
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE TREND IN SECURED CREDITOR
EXEMPTION LAW
CERCLA's goal of cleaning up abandoned and inactive hazardous
waste sites is admirable and necessary. The problem, however, lies
with the recurring question involved in environmental legislation-
who is going to pay for the environmental benefit? The current trend
of narrowing the secured creditor exemption and holding lenders liable
for vast environmental clean-up goes too far.
Under the Fleet Factors "capacity to influence" test, 1 9 almost any
secured creditor would be liable for environmental response costs. Be-
cause Fleet Factors 'ocused on "capacity or power," and not actual
exercise of power, all influential creditors run the risk of financial ruin
when lending to businesses. The Fleet Factors test is unacceptable and
unwise, for it discourages secured creditors from lending to potentially
productive businesses in our financially strapped economy.
Although the Bergsoe analysis 12 ° proyides some hope that a "capac-
ity to influence" test will not long survive, Bergsoe's usefulness to se-
cured creditors is limited. 21 Bergsoe did not define the acceptable
extent of management participation by creditors. Consequently, se-
cured creditors are left with no indication of appropriate conduct. A
secured creditor's safest route may be to deny loans to companies, fear-
ing possible environmental complications until the courts or Congress
develop a clear rule for the creditors to follow.
Assuming that the proposed EPA rule becomes final, 122 secured
creditors are still unreasonably burdened. The heavy "policing" duties
that the proposed rule requires1 23 obliges lending institutions to be-
come "environmental experts" before extending a loan. Such a duty
would impose a financial burden to banks, which in turn would pass
within the exemption's protection if the lender acts primarily to protect its security
interest. Id. The EPA stressed that a secured creditor's actions that are environmen-
tally beneficial are not considered to be participation in management. Id.
119. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fleet Fac-
tors test.
120. See supra notes 82-98 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Bergsoe
opinion.
121. Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under Superfund,
Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 19, col. 4.
122. See supra notes 99-118 and accompanying text for a discussion of the proposed
EPA rule.
123. See supra notes 103-15 discussing requirements of the proposed EPA rule.
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the burdens on to customers.12 4 This result flies in the face of CER-
CLA's goal to force responsible parties to pay the cost of the environ-
mental clean-up.12 5
The only realistic solution to the confusion presented by this issue is
for Congress to directly address the secured creditor exemption when it
amends CERCLA in 1995. The secured creditor exemption is vital to
the lending community, and clarification of its reach is crucial.
Although the courts and the EPA have attempted to elucidate the is-
sue, a long-standing protection of this magnitude demands direct con-
gressional attention.
V. CONCLUSION
Secured creditors have traditionally found safety against CERCLA
response costs under the secured creditor exemption.1 26  Recently,
courts have narrowed the scope of the exemption's protection by hold-
ing secured creditors liable for environmental clean-up costs.1 27 This
trend has caused an uproar in the lending community.12 8 The EPA
responded to this reaction by proposing a rule to clarify the coverage of
the secured creditor exemption.
1 29
The court decisions, and even the proposed EPA rule, represent un-
acceptable burdens on the lending community. The recent develop-
ment in the case law sends a signal to secured creditors to discontinue
or significantly reduce loans to businesses, while awaiting a final rule.
The EPA rule provides no relief because its extensive policing duties
require secured creditors to become virtual environmental experts to
124. See Brief of Appellant Fleet Factors Corp. at 31, United States v. Fleet Factors
Corp., 901 F.2d 1550 (1Ith Cir. 1990). Such an increase would be reflected in higher
interest rates, higher costs of doing business, and increased prices for the general public.
Id.
125. The essential policy underlying CERCLA is to place the ultimate responsibil-
ity for clean-up on those responsible for the problem. United States v. Aceto Agricul-
tural Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986).
126. See supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text discussing the statute.
127. See supra notes 54-99 and accompanying text discussing Fleet Factors and
Bergsoe.
128. See generally Freeman, Recent Case Law May Expand Lenders' Risks Under
SuperFund, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 17, 1990, at 19, col. I (discussing the impact on the lending
community).
129. See supra notes 100-18 and accompanying text discussing the proposed rule.
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avoid CERCLA liability. 3 ° These problems translate into increased
costs to the general public through higher interest rates and costs of
doing business. Such a result directly contradicts CERCLA's central
purpose-to hold responsible parties liable for clean-up costs.
M. Joan Cobb*
130. See supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text discussing the burdens on the
lending community.
* J.D. 1991, Washington University.
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